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Re-Worlding: A Theory of Art/Law 
“Law and its order are based on representation and as such might be considered beautiful. Behind 
representation however is art, just as behind the beauty of the law is the sublimity of justice.” 
 
Mary Slaughter ‘The Arc and the Zip: Deleuze and Lyotard on Art’i 
Introduction 
 
In a world of mediated spectacle upon spectacle flowing through our screens, it is easy to become 
convinced that the law is a mere fabulation with no external reality, a fantasy beholden only to the 
whims of the few, with little possibility for resistance.  Yet in between these moments of despair and 
fragmentation, there exists a requirement to alter, to re-mould and re-form forgotten and seemingly 
lost understandings of justice.   
 
This piece argues it has become clear there is a new legal epistemology and ontology emerging, 
through a re-worlding of art and law.  This emphasis on re-worlding suggests the two have in fact 
never been distinct. This new intersection of art and law within legal thinking, activism, and artistic 
practice, is the movement and phenomena of ‘Art/Law’. Art/Law is the coming together of theory 
and practice of legal and political aesthetics, understood as (im)materially performed.  Art/Law is 
understood as an onto-epistemic-ethics, a choice of action, that acknowledges the role of matter 
within practice, creating ways of seeing, knowing, being and learningii. 
This piece is a story of coming together of these practices, a postulation of observations and 
experiences, where ways of knowing and learning around law are becoming of prescience beyond 
the law world; where legal scholarship may step beyond books into a kinetics of change and 
emergence.  This concern for and of law, is seen in light of epistemological shifts and trends 
connecting the legal with the spatial-temporal, the visual, affectual, aesthetic and performative. 
 
Arguments for art being law, and law being art, are relayed through similarities between legal and 
artistic method, the treatment of art by law and vice versa, in order to understand what Art/Law is. 
This in turn questions the role of art in resistance, and whether resistance itself can be art by 
considering debates in art history on relational aesthetics, the autonomy of art, and specifically 
contemporary art’s conscious turn to ‘socially engaged art’ in recent years. The culpable role of the 
‘art world’, co-determined by the ‘law world’, in supporting and upholding systems of capitalism 
where art is traded as a form of moveable property, commodity and economic instrument through 
histories of material aesthetic imperialism, is situated as central to maintaining the artificial 
separation between art, law and resistance. This separation exists due to the formalism of individual 
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property, whereas Art/Law suggests a mechanism where theory and practice meet to overcome the 
advanced plague of spectacular capitalism in the hope of creating new juridical-aesthetic 
movements, openly bringing the practices of law, art and resistance together. 
 
First the concept of art/law and its connotations will be outlined, followed by how the relation 
between art and law have been considered in legal scholarship thus far.  The deliberate move 
towards the use of law in art, art in legal teaching, and the various spatio-temporal, visual, aesthetic 
and affectual turns in legal thinking will follow to propose an increased coming together of art and 
law in its variant forms. The ‘/‘ of art/law is relayed as resistance and change, an emergent mattering 
of law and art in a non-dialect movement.  Art historical literature on socially engaged art that 
indicate departures in thought around the need for autonomy on art, and relational aesthetics 
within this, are used to decipher the place of politics, relationality, matter and form within art/law 
phenomena. Art and law seek to remain autonomous and yet this artificial authority has been 
eroded, or needs to be overcome, as suggested by the Situationist International, amongst a radical 
heritage in art and philosophy that seeks to overcome the spectacle through the proffering of the 
end of art and end of law within critical thinking; providing an understanding of the important 
positioning of art/law today. This end of art and law is relayed through property as that which 
shapes the form of law worlds and art worlds, the official and the unofficial, leading to a causal 
argument for art/law as a necessary onto-epistemic ethics of ‘resistant (in)formality’, grounded in 
practice accounting for the materiality of change.  This materiality is finally argued as an 
acknowledgement of justice, a consideration of uncertainty, resulting in a new way of seeing, 
thinking and action, in the coming together of art, law and resistance. 
What is Art/Law? 
 
The question of ‘what is art?’, seems as antique as the nature and origins of law, in spite of its 
connotations as a product of the enlightenment, prior conceptions surmounting to the nature of 
beauty. Considering this, a starting point might be to set the terms of what we mean by art, and the 
same for law, using parameters to determine the limits of each, in order to de-limit them. There are 
understandably problems with closed definitions, however, given that at once we try to categorise, 
we then exclude erstwhile understandings of both. An analytic philosophy may claim art needs to be 
categorised, either according to its function as an object creating a pleasing response, or as 
something that has been produced using to certain methods and motions that mean it can be 
considered created as a work of art. These functionalist or proceduralist descriptions could just as 
well be read as a legal positivism of Hartiii or Kelseniv, or even a subtext for a legal pluralism, a 
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reminder of the similarities between art and law, or merely the way in which defining processes 
occur across disciplines and practices. 
 
Given the risk of occlusion, the task is thus not to define art and law and its relatedness, but to 
explicate the extent to which they are one and the same material practice, the methods through 
which they have been kept apart, and what new ontic ethics of seeing can be realised in the 
movement of Art/Law.  At the same time, to ignore the distinction and existence of these categories 
is to redact the existential and practical realities of the art world and the law world, and the violence 
that has occurred as a consequence of their separation. The question of autonomy in art and 
autonomy in law appears as prescient for both’s legitimacyv, there being a liminality between art 
and law in order to propose a practice that supersedes artificial boundaries.   
 
For Hegel, the definition of art is in reference to its content and presentation, as the highest reality 
in sensuous formvi. Danto refers to Seel speaking of aesthetics as the creation of unique experiences 
in the world, and Santayana refers to art as relaying a direct sense of beauty, whereas Duchamp 
demonstrated that aesthetics and art can be separatedvii.  Each of these demarcations of what art 
and law may be are broadly Western in scope with the heavy weight of positionality attached in 
turn.  In this occidental tradition of aesthetics and politics, considering Platonic beauty over the 
danger of art, Kant’s disinterested judgement, Hegel’s ‘end of art’, a Nietszchean art to overcome 
nihilism, as well as latterly Adornoviii, Debordix and Rancièrex; for these thinkers art is seen as an 
artificial category, as much as critical legal extrapolations of law.  
 
Following Davies’ cautious desire not to define lawxi, she postulates that, following a non-essential 
legal pluralism of Tamanahaxii, at the very least law is unlimited, “connected and relational .. law is 
mobile, plural, and material”xiii. Taking this as a point of departure, the same can be said for art, it is 
plural, mobile, and material, as well as immaterial.  
 
Art should also be unlimited to art/law, only bounded by the reification of law, and the same for 
law/art, as only bounded by the reification of art.  The only thing else, is resistance, which is the ‘/’ in 
art/law, which we will come to shortly.  Art/law is a term that has been used by Karavokyrisxiv to 
highlight the: 
 
“The formative act of the creator meets the—de facto and de jure—
inevitable boundary of the look of others until it turns, depending on the 
outcome of this uncertain communication, from a subjective statement 
(mere work) into an objective norm (work of art/law).”  
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Art/law, in this work, is an onto-epistemic ethics, an understanding of the agential nature of matter 
practice, change, not entirely divorced from Karavokyris’ understanding in the sense that both art 
and law is the substance of art/law, but also as a method of teaching, learning and living that is a 
movement as much as a descriptor of all law and art in sumxv. 
Art and Law in Thought and Practice 
 
Direct conceptions of the connection between art and law are not new and are found most deeply 
embedded within critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and critical legal theories of aesthetics.  
Understandings are extensive, from which legal forms are present in art, through to painting, 
sculpture, literature or music reliant on representational methods of symbol, emblem, motifxvi.  First, 
we will consider the scholarship that specifically refers to the concomitant relationship between art 
and law before discussing law and aesthetics per se. 
 
When we interrogate the role of art in law and vice versa, we are automatically referring to an 
alteration of the senses, aesthesis meaning to sense in the traditional understanding, where external 
realities meet our sense-making logics, or illogics more appropriately. Thinkers around law and 
emotion, law and the senses, indeed law and aesthetics, sit in a tradition of Western thinking around 
encountering, feeling, hermeneutical processing of two external worlds meeting, that of the surplus 
of every other to every other. Understandings of law and aesthetics have been specifically resonant 
in critical legal thinking, xviiixvii legal semiotics  and socio-legal studiesxix.  Critical legal studies assumes 
an acknowledgement of law as politics, where all can be broken down to a constructed and 
performative action, leading to understandings of law as only viable through rhetoric, images, spaces 
and ascribed boundaries of aesthetics.  Gearey argues, “Law makes use of the image to give sense of 
its own continuity and centrality to social being”xx, where the reification of law and its legitimacy is 
understood through something tangible and interacting with our sensesxxi.  
 
The place of the image and representation in law comes with a backdrop of interpreting the legality 
as a text, as nothing unfolding beyond the surface of its signifier following poststructuralist 
assumptions of performativity and non-essentialism.  Law and aesthetics scholarship has 
predominantly been associated with the law and literature movement as a result, a clear correlation 
between the written word and the force of law that lends itself well to Derridean or generally 
postmodern deconstructionism. Debates over the ‘and’ of law and literature nod to a desire to 
analyse and break down the barriers between legality and literature, seeing the phenomena one and 
the same, much in the same mood as this piece regarding the enmeshed nature of art/law.  Beyond 
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the aesthetic of the written word has been sonic understandings of law and music
xxiii
xxii, as well as 
wider considerations of the performative, iterable and improvised nature of law . 
 
Legal thought around the communication between art and law, oscillates between their existence in 
pure synchronicity, to entire other, to being one and the same, to art being law, law being art, or the 
necessity of bringing them back from their historical severance to a space of coterminacy. 
 
Scholarship that directly demolishes the relationship between law and art, largely being Anglo-
American, can delineate its incongruent differences
xxvii, exclaiming that
xxiv.  Wilkinson speaks of the lack of force in an 
artist’s power of persuasion, as opposed to the coercive wrath of authority that juridical decision-
making exacts, where “an artist's power flows from internal, individual genius; in contrast, a judge is 
vested with external, positional authority”xxv.  Nevertheless, they argue this distinction between 
paradigms of art and law can serve as a positive for the purposes of law, “because artistic process, 
purpose, and power is so different from that of law, art serves as the perfect model for what judges 
should not do and ought not to be”xxvi.  A less than supportive account of any relation between art 
and law, and indeed, a propinquity between artists and lawyers, is further unabashedly shot down 
by Duong : 
“law should not be the refuge for those who are not strong enough to take the risks of art. 
Just because rhetoric and social issues can straddle the two domains does not mean that 
great artists are practicing law, or that great jurists are writing literary novels.” 
 
This understanding of Art as Art and Law as Law, where either a creative or an advocate are only 
operating in ‘dual professions’xxviii, inscribes the lawyer as rational and asensual, and an artist as 
irrational and sensual.  
In contradistinction, writers such as Vatulescuxxix and Wilkinson discuss the normative similarity of 
art and law.  Turleyxxx highlights a coming togetherness: “[i]n many ways, the endeavours of law and 
art seem to have converged .. as the Court has moved from more classic to more impressionistic 
interpretations of constitutional provisions”.  In some senses, and this piece may be guilty of the 
same, by suddenly noticing the similarities between art and law we are reinforcing the legitimacy of 
their estrangement, where being awed by their similarity is at once ignorant of the daily 
ethnography of the artist and the lawyer’s practice. In a not dissimilar way, acknowledging their 
difference can also infer a unified origin of art and law, more bounded, more one-worlded.  Martinez 
reflects on the atomistic autonomy of art encouraged via a Kantian parting of art and law as ‘two 
systematic worlds clearly demarcated from each other’xxxi, and the disciplines themselves becoming 
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introverted and self-referential from the enlightenment onwards, at least in the Western 
hemisphere.   
Similarly, there are proponents of a one-way version of law either as a form of art, or art as a form of 
law.  Kee describes law as an artistic medium, where “to consider such patterns of recognition is to 
accordingly consider law’s own materiality”xxxii. In a similar manner, Martinezxxxiii
xxxiv
 lists artistic 
practices of collage, assemblage and montage as prime examples of juridical method and form, even 
more unbounding through technological advances .   
 
For scholars who propound art as law, where artworks are ‘mere rule systems’
xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxviii
xxxix, rendered by Sammons as
xxxv, art itself with its 
own internal reckoning becomes an external norm, such as derivative of Karavokyris’ art/law, where 
‘the order of law can be the aesthetic beauty in law’  or one grundnorm of art that “.. requires 
that you submit yourself for the moment to its authority, as one might a religious or a legal text” . 
This moment of authenticity, the flash of the origin, speaks of a Benjaminian aura , an unravelling 
of the invisible through the visible  truth in abstraction for Kandinskyxl. 
Beyond the predominantly Western analytical scholarship on art and law discussed so far, many 
within the critical theory tradition and increasingly those arguments of new materialist and 
posthumanist thought, may argue there is more at play than just a prescribed divorce of practice 
where Art is Art and Law is Law.  Clear delineations are not so easily traced despite the daily realisms 
of either profession, and their surrounding environments.  Artists, since their work has become 
tradable as property synchronically ascribed individual copyright protection, operate at the caprices 
of global capital, utilising best effective business models in order to survive the demands of the 
market, whilst infusing the limits and boundedness of their environment as they mould their 
compound material resources for their craft.  Lawyers are still using their prose and poise to sway 
judicial decisions with a heightened empathy for those unable to access legal recourse, expressed 
through political action and creative expediency.   
 
In reality, the predominant way law interacts with art is through the body of art law, which refers to 
law that regulates the buying and selling of artxli, as well as national regimes of intellectual property 
rights. Legal protection has been afforded to artists in the UK since the Engraving Act 1794, an 
indication of correlation between an increasingly codified body of law and its reliance on individual 
property as a model of relational value, the rise of possessive individualism through the 
mercantilism, and the development of what we have come to understand as ‘art’.   
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Mattering Turns – The Spatial, Visual, Aesthetic, Affectual 
 
In recent years studies in law have moved with philosophical debates, from the text to other forms 
of aesthetic consideration realised in spatio-temporal descriptionsxlii that seek to account for the 
manner in which law creates its surroundings and the same the other way around. This movement 
has expressed itself through consideration of law relating to the city, environment, property, land, 
and more recently, depicting the way law is experienced through the senses of sight, sound, smell 
and touch.   
 
Rosexliii would argue responses to a globalised culture ever mediated and structured by the play of 
images, whether on or offline - this true ‘culmination of the spectacle’ Debordxliv - is being reflected 
within the rise of visual research and teaching methods.  This ‘convergence’ of social production and 
epistemological trends, has not been missed in the fields of socio-legal and critical legal enquiry.  The 
inclination to understand and describe law’s images and chromatic presence, has recently been 
termed as the ‘visual turn’ by Mulcahyxlv.  Bottomley and Moorexlvi have similarly postulated the 
necessity of law’s ‘rendering visible’ to pose as ‘diagrammatic thinking’, where critical legal theory 
has come to an exhaustion.  
 
Legal scholarship’s move to the sensible, the visual, the haptic, its aesthetic turnxlvii
xlviii
, is characteristic 
of a wider visual and affective shift in focus across research and teaching in the social sciences and 
humanities, and a turn away from humanism to posthumanism .  These accounts have led to a 
point where the affectual nature of law, the way in which law impacts and interacts with its 
surrounding environment, its matter, have become of central concern.  Massumixlix speaks of affect 
as either an emergent non-representative potential and becoming found within animate and 
inanimate beings, based upon Spinozan philosophy of conatus and affectus used by Deleuze; or that 
which brings about emotion through the human sensesl.  Both definitions infer an encounter, a 
meeting point, and a movement between internalities and externalities creating certain responses.  
Olson argues that affect has replaced literature as the other of law within law and literature studies, 
tracing this back through the influences of affect theory in posthumanism, queer theory, new 
materialisms, arguing that affect has replaced Foucauldian ‘discourse’ as the leading term in current 
critical commentaryli.  Matthews and Veitch also relay McKee’s ‘jurismoprhs’lii, Philoppopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ ‘lawscape’liii and other engagements with legal materialism (such as Pottageliv) as 
seeking “answers to significant changes within our underlying social, technological and economic 
conditions” in an overbearing realisation of Anthropocene that are more plural and less structured 
as a singly transcendent form previously eschewed in sovereigntylv. 
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With this in mind, art/law is a natural step on this journey from the abstract, the textual, the spatio-
temporal, the aesthetic-affectual, as a convergence of theory and practice, in a move to practical, 
skills-based paradigm of seeing, being, and learning not too dissimilar from an interpellation of 
Guattari’s ethico-aestheticslvi. Has there even been an art/law turn?  It is interesting to suggest that 
this (re)surge in the interest in art and law is coming from many angles, most notably from the works 
of artists, as well as in legal teaching, making this extant focus on art and law empirically different 
from previous theoretical engagements in law, politics and aesthetics.  In teaching and research, 
legal academics have been using arts practices to critically dissect law in their teaching for some time 
(fig. 1), such as Bottomley and Lim and Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos advocating for more 
experiential pedagogical methods, where students are ‘walking with the law’ as such, taking them 
outside the classroom to see how the law interacts with the world around them in order to 
understand the pervasive role of law in the built environmentlvii. Olivia Barr’s ‘jurisprudence of 
movement’ (2016) similarly proffers a walking and immersive method to understanding Law and its 
colonising footsteps. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ziherllviii
lxiii
 and Lüttickenlix have noted a ‘proliferation of artists’ projects that address, mimic, and 
intervene in the matters of the law’, such as the Turner Prize nominee artist-scholar-lawyer-
architect-research group ‘Forensic Architecture’lx; Jack Tan’s ‘Karaoke Court’lxi; and the important 
work of artist, agitator Adelita-Husni-Bey questioning the role of democratic law-making processes 
and property in housing and protest through her art/law intervention ‘Convention on the Use of 
Space’lxii (all of which we will return to shortly).  Law has become a focus of representation within 
forms of art, such as ‘Declared Void II’  by Carey Young on the distinct limitations and spatial and 
temporal reality of law, brought to the fore through her deployment of the liminality of legal 
relations as exemplified within contracts and constitutions (fig. 2).  Palestinian artist Yazan Khalili 
also allies art and law in ‘I, The Artwork’lxiv where he worked with a lawyer to draft a contract ‘Deed 
of Ownership and Condition of Existence’ that forbade the artwork to be owned or controlled by an 
occupying power, as a result of his frustration that an Israeli collector had sought to buy his work.  In 
a similar way, law and the capitalist mode of exchange was the focus of artist Kojin Karatani’s ‘The 
Structure of World History: From Modes of Production, to Modes of Exchange’lxv, offering an insight 
into how law and capital structures society and engenders ongoing inequalities as a result. These are 
just a few of the many other artists such as Zuleikha Choudhuri, Alicja Rogalska, Marco Godoy, Helen 
[Inset Fig. 1 Law and Aesthetics students at Law School (2014-15)] 
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Knowles, all specifically engaging with concepts and practices of law, court processes, witnessing, 
contract, property, disputes, and rights within their practice and focus of their worklxvi. 
 
 
 
  
The ‘/’ of Art/Law 
 
“The act of resistance has two faces. It is human and it is also the act of art.”  
Gilles Deleuze ‘What is the Creative Act?’lxvii 
So what is the ‘/‘ of art/law? Questions of art, politics and ethics are intrinsically bound to art/law. 
For instance, the semiotics of discerning what constitutes politics and political action, assumes 
reference to rights and freedoms. Pilcherlxviii directly relays the political, through Mark Wallinger’s 
‘State Britain’lxix as an example of art and resistance shifting the boundaries of law, and consequently 
what we consider art, and/or legal or illegal protest. To step further and assert politics as a creativity 
is an assumption of ethics and justice borne of and with the aesthetic, yet as Oscar Wilde once 
asked, “how can art be both aesthetically beautiful and morally destructive?”. Art, however, has 
morphed away from a concern for formal beauty, where to be aesthetically-pleasing, begs the 
question, ‘for whom?’.   
 
Tracing some kind of relation between art, law and resistance may not always be considered useful 
or possible. More productive is to understand them as one, their historically enforced separation, 
and the increased prevalence and necessity of their reunion.  The ‘/’ of art/law is, therefore, 
resistance, where an assumed duality of legality and artistry is not the case, resistance being 
alternating change, a renewal, and an opening. Yet art and law specifically are known for their 
separate attempts at appearing peculiar entities to themselves, their autonomy and unity as the 
basis of their legitimacy, their category. However, paradoxically, their juridical regeneration only 
happens through their encounter with uncertainty, the ‘events’ of the political reality that inscribe 
the next course of action for art/law where “artistic activities become co-creators of legal and 
political reality and by extension the expressive material of art becomes a creative part of the law”lxx. 
Questions of resistance are less prescient within Anglo-American legal theory around art and law, 
than art history scholarship of relational aesthetics and socially engaged art.  In true convergence of 
subject of research and research methodlxxi, art history and philosophies of art can further our 
understanding of the I of art/law. 
 
[Insert Fig. 2 Declared 
Void II (2013), Carey Young] 
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The last twenty years has seen an increasing literature pointing to the deliberate use of art and 
creative practices within resistance, reflecting a conscious paradigm shift within art practices 
becoming ‘socially engaged’, ‘dialogic’, and ‘participatory’.  In critic Bishop’s 2016 biography of 
socially engaged art and its connection to spectacle, she speaks of a social as well as ethical turn, 
where within artlxxii: 
 
“..questions of conscience and obligation, of recognition and respect, of justice 
and law, which not so long ago would have been dismissed as the residue of an 
outdated humanism, have returned to occupy, if not centre stage, then 
something pretty close to it.”  
 
 
Bishop gives a genealogy of deliberately coupled art and politics, starting with Italian Fascism and 
the Futurist movement, and the various Avant Garde movements of the twentieth century that 
followed, notably Dadaism and the Situationist International (SI).  Echoing on the multitudinous ways 
in which politics has failed to curb war, violence, capital and ideology, Bishop conveys the seeming 
necessity for art to step in to the political realm and consciously draw in the observer in order to ‘do 
something’: “… there must be an art of action, interfacing with reality, taking steps – however small 
– to repair the social bond”lxxiii.   
 
The turn to the social and political in Western art in recent decades has been notably influenced by 
the theory of ‘relational aesthetics’ of art historian Nicolas Bourriaud, describing modern art’s move 
to deliberately political art.  Instead of giving reference to imaginary utopias, art can now “.. actually 
be ways of living and models of action within the existing real”lxxiv. The classical understanding of ‘art 
for art’s sake’ is replaced with the revelation of 
lxxvi
lxxvii
‘relational art’ that weaves theory into human issues 
and social interactions, such as famous artist Joseph Beuys’ ‘social organism as a work of art’lxxv. This 
is opposed to art existing in “an independent and private symbolic space”, a move which Bourriaud 
argues is a radical upheaval within the aesthetic and cultural goals of art and its movements.  Bishop 
in her reply to Bourriaud critiques this assumption, arguing the role of art is always to affect and 
instil discomfort and rupture in us .  Following from Ranciére, Bishop is sceptical of what she sees 
as the ‘instrumentalisation of ethics as a strategic zone’ by socially engaged art and those who 
commission and encourage it, culminating in a “collapse of aesthetic and political into new forms of 
order” . 
 
At the same time as contemporary art changing, so too has the use of art within protest movements.  
McKee talks of the Occupy movement and encamped protests of the 1990s, as forms of art through 
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their performative and subversive gestures of alternative ways of beinglxxviii lxxix.  Scholars   have 
spoken of the Situationist influenced ‘artivism’ of the alter-globalisation movement, referring back 
to spectacular events such as the Battle of Seattle 1999 as a critical juncture of resistance against the 
growing behemoth of globalisation and the structural adjustment programmes of the Washington 
Consensus financial institutions, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation and the 
World Bank.  Or the anti-roads and political rave movement ‘Reclaim the Streets’ in the UK who 
sought to save land from development and protest against the illegalisation of rave culture (as well 
as gypsy and traveller ways of life and further limitations on squatting) under the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994, using subversive, Situationist-inspired humour and civil disobedience, 
typified directly through their symbolic occupation of time and space.  
 
It is a wonder what the anti-advertising culture-jammers, graffiti writers and street artists
lxxxi
lxxxii
lxxx of the 
1970s and 1980s (not least the SI and Dadaists of the years preceding) would say about an 
apparently methodical turn to political engagement within mainstream art, and this prescribed 
distinction between political and non-political art as well as an overt use of legal forms in artists’ 
works .  The rapid abstraction of form within Western Aesthetics from Expressionism to Cubism, 
Futurism and Russian Constructivism, that paved the way for Dadaism, Surrealism, and the SI, was an 
open, defiant and delegitimation of established aesthetic canon away from the aesthetically pleasing 
to a cerebral experience and political positionality.  These artists deformed aesthetics so as to 
subvert and question; the SI became known for their acts of détournement, the subversion of 
capitalist symbols and signs in an act of defiance to the rapid commodification of everyday life, as 
well as art and artistic practice. Marcel Duchamp  moved the realm of the everyday into the world 
of legitimately acceptable aesthetics through appropriation and re-appropriation of seemingly 
artless objects, bringing into question the very limits of art and politics and the role of the audience 
in asserting this.  This followed with the advent of Pop Art where the visual and performative arts 
were further freed from their limiting painterly forms and yet synchronically advanced their move 
into the realm of commodity, property and global mainstreamism even moreso.  Nevertheless, it 
was this preceding turn of appropriation and subversion that brought to the fore the political nature 
of art and the artists, and the role art can play in fostering radicality, critique, and social change 
through protest.  
 
Scholettelxxxiii critiques this to the point that we now have art/life completion, but this at the 
detriment of anything really being ‘new’, inspiring, or the understanding the limits of phenomena 
that may not be art forms, where the ‘artification’ of areas of life just mean that they become new 
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commons that can be extracted by capital, alongside the further value-added nature of the artist’s 
role.  Is this the same thing that is happening to law, or is there more to Art/Law than an aesthetic 
fad at the end of art? 
Spectacle, Form and Property in Art/Law Worlds 
 
“Claustrophobic, tautological, our bare art world is our bare art world is our bare art world” 
  
Gregory Scholette ‘Delirium and Resistance’lxxxiv 
 
Karavokyris asks the question, could it be that art and law do not differ at all, ontologically and 
methodologically?lxxxv; but what if we were to ask the same question of art world and law worlds, 
synchronically?   
 
The ambiguous and complex make-up of the art world, from museum, to radical art school, to 
gallery, to dealer, to artist, makes for an uneasy description.  McKee, instead of using the 
connotation of art world that “connotes a unitary, self-enclosed universe of like-minded cognoscenti 
making, viewing, judging, and sometimes buying and selling works of art”lxxxvi
lxxxvii
lxxxviii
lxxxix
, which given the 
inequalities the term ‘art world’ that Becker  spoke of does not suffice – he refers to it as an ‘art 
system’.  The art system is not one that works evenly and simply with each element of its entity 
working in equilibrium, but more the unstable meshwork of a complex adaptive system that 
inherently creates an “ever-present potential for antagonism between what Pierre Bourdieu  
would call the dominant and dominant and dominated elements thereof” .  Scholettexc describes 
akin the inequality of the art world where those who labour make up its majority are its ‘dark 
matter’, those unseen and unrepresented within the industry who uphold and create the successes 
of the very few well known artists. 
 
The culpable role of the ‘art world’, co-determined by the ‘law world’, in supporting and upholding 
systems of capitalism where art is traded as a form of moveable property, commodity and economic 
instrument through histories of material aesthetic imperialism, is situated as central to maintaining 
the artificial separation between art, law and resistance. This is not a novel interpretation, and one 
reliant upon a Marxian questioning of separation and negation of the spectacle, the alienation of the 
worker whether artist or otherwise, from their true creative selves through the forces of production.  
This is further relayed in Rancière’s distribution of the sensible, where all that we perceive, and 
sense is divided up and categorised by capitalxci. 
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There has been surprisingly little critical analysis of the connection between the art market and the 
law market. Rotter has commented on the insufficient attention has been paid to ways in which law 
defines and gives content “to broadly accepted ideas about art”
xciii xcvii
xcviii
xcii. Surely there has been a wealth of 
philosophical discussion around the commodification of creativity, and the ‘end of art’ where true 
art is deemed by Hegel  , Adorno and Horkheimerxciv, Debordxcv, Dantoxcvi, Kosuth , to have come 
to a finitude with Western capitalism, and indeed, beyond it. Art in the mode we understand it 
today, is a product and security to be bought and sold where “the explicit social manipulations that 
are necessary to maintain perceived value in the face of technological advancement provide a 
window into the social construction of art as a valuable commodity” .  Truly, art is individual 
property. 
 
Rotter argues that law helps to maintain art’s aura and its autonomy, “it impacts both the practice of 
art and how we as a society interact with it and take an interest in it”xcix through the unique 
treatment of art and its artists, via legal categories of permissible expression, rights of artists and the 
economic benefits of its patrons.  In spite of Rotter’s less critical take, it is a useful illustration of the 
influence of law, on the way the art world is structured around art as property, and artists as 
owners.  Bishop’s explicit connection between value judgements around art and government policy 
and law, is less positive. She connects a rise in ‘participatory practices’ to its viability with business 
and commerciabilityc, with reference to the ‘Everyone is a Creative’ Green Paper of New Labour in 
2001.  She associates the David Cameron-era ‘Big Society’ with the rise in co-curation and co-
working as encouraging unpaid forms of artistic labour, whilst also enticing in the excluded, the 
outsider, the spectator into the art process, product and form. 
 
The flexibility of the ‘no collar’ art worker as she describes it, to the neoliberal order, is discussed 
furiously by artist and activist Scholette, where “today, artists are simply another worker, no more, 
no less”ci. Repeating materialist critiques of capital’s alienating force, Benjaminian incantations of 
art’s lost aura in the age of mechanical reproduction, the increased heteronomy of contemporary 
art, and the arguments for art’s autonomy are as paradoxical as the same for law’s autonomy. 
Derrida and Foucault have questioned this enforced separation through the monopoly of violence of 
the modern sovereign state, resulting in claims of positive legality where state law has 
institutionalised itself through the techné of capital and property. This same instituting process has 
occurred with and co-determined by, the establishment of the art world. Just in the way it has been 
necessary for Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions to take hold of the plurality of laws and 
resistances outside of its realm, and coalesce them into a unified object of law, the same can be said 
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for the art institution - its authority as its unicity.  In contrast to the art establishment, Bishop speaks 
of the discipline of art’s boundary-making as necessity to “paradoxically remain autonomous in 
order to initiate or achieve a model for social change”cii, where there rests a tension between artistic 
and social critique. But what does this tell us of the instituting role of property within both art and 
law worlds, and how they precipitate one another’s form as a result?  In a not unrelated way, what is 
the connection between the historical materialism of property and capital, and the (im)materialism 
of artworks used, moulded and performed by artists, and how does this relate to a furtherance of 
art/law? 
 
Property and intellectual property of copyright is the dominant framework by which law 
understands art, and indeed, names it and demarcates what it is, within a specific language.  The 
closest we come to a definition in England and Wales is defined under the Copyright Designs and 
Patents Act (CDPA) 1988 as an ‘artistic work’ “irrespective of its artistic quality” (section 4 (1)(a)), 
repeated under Article 2 of the international treaty the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works 1986. Following Marx, thinkers such as Duránciii, Martinciv, Spaulding and 
Dembycv, Hudsoncvi have described the central role of property within the form of artworks 
produced as a result.  Duráncvii argues the congenital role of intellectual property law in the flow of 
capital and production of commodity form, and the ‘activity of art as property’: 
   
“Artistic proprietorship is based on the assumption that what is fabricated or simply 
chosen—that is, the artistic object—is the material realisation of the subjective and 
thus unique and singular intellect. Before the artist appears socially as owner of the 
products of thought, he is constituted as a private owner of thoughts. It is this private 
ownership that is sanctioned by intellectual property rights.” 
 
 
Wickendencviii further connects the effect of categories of individual property on legal definitions of 
what constitute artworks within the CPDA and other instruments, and the resultant form legally 
defined art works may take (and which artists are protected).  She argues the now outmoded 
definitions of art within intellectual property law, arguing the influence of formalism within art 
historical theory that is outdated and leaves the legal definition “vaguely defined and do not 
adequately reflect contemporary artistic practice”. Instead of composition, order, spatial and 
temporal construction of figures and sensations within a piece rendering something an artwork, she 
argues for an alteration within the CPDA to include what qualifies as an artistic work should be 
linked to artistic purpose, albeit with concerns of denoting intentionalism attached.  The numerous 
clausus or closed list nature of how an artistic work is defined, illustrates the powerful role law has in 
determining what is considered a work of art or otherwisecix, the limiting construction of art by the 
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boundedness of law, whilst a legal authority that according to Wickenden, is informed and held up 
by aesthetic theories of form connected to property.  
 
Consideration of form is congenital to recent object-oriented-ontological discussions of the 
importance of aesthetics within philosophy, and yet within art history, anti-formalism is a rebuff to 
the aesthetic positivism of formalism that has come hand-in-hand with the dawn of conceptual, non-
representational, and socially-engaged art.  The conflicting yet co-present role of formalism across 
both art and law infers an authority to form, a formality, a property. The numerous clausus reasserts 
the central role of property in law and capital, defining what art is, in a move reminiscent of the 
closed list of legal estates and equitable interests of section 1 the Law of Property Act 1925, where 
all other imaginations and practices of what properties may exist outside, are excluded in a dualism 
of informal, and thus a claim to entitlement unprotectedcx.  Does the fetishism of the commodity, 
the combined obsession of protection from and protection to, appropriation, mean the version of 
law that upholds copyright, at least in the Common Law traditions, completely misunderstands art? 
Or perhaps it is more that any form, formalism or institutionalisation, misunderstands creative and 
poietic pluralism of change and uncertainty.  
 
Macleancxi relays the increased prevalence of forgery indicative of a specific connection between the 
development of artistic proprietary rights and Western capitalism’s view of the artist’s individual 
genius that cannot be reproduced. Fakeness and inauthenticity uphold the ‘originality’ of art as 
capital, and a genealogical intersection of individual property within creativity in Eurocentric markets 
per se.  What paradoxically is present within discussions of authenticity and capital, is also found 
within Benjamin’s conception of the aura within art – that which is lost through facsimile, 
predominantly in reference to photography but with prescience to questions around links between 
the autonomy of art beyond its surplus value and legal proprietorial claim, and the role of material 
affect that may support art as an object internal to itself.   
 
David Joselitcxii describes art as a currency, one that transcends description and vests great power in 
the image, produced at the intersection of value and form.  Value and form are expressions of 
property, as tangible material and intangible surplus.  Art’s value is derived from the Western 
preference for the individual genius of the artist that is second in the world to the most conveyed 
form of capital other than land - a moveable and highly transitory form of asset. As the likes of 
Adorno, Debord and Jameson made clear, art is imbricated within the production and consumption 
of commodity, radically opposed to and yet simultaneously supported by its integration into the 
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industries of capitalism, significantly supporting the economic base of global capital as a form of high 
value property, as opposed to just being symbolic of itcxiii.   
 
Thus, there is a complicit role of aesthetic forms within the spread of property and the reliance of 
these aesthetics on legitimation through the support of law, as well as the exclusion of non-Western 
forms of aesthetics and lawcxiv.  The matter of art is the cannon fodder of capital’s accumulation, 
where the exploitation of surplus value of the artist’s labour is simultaneously the extraction of 
affect to produce certain forms of law as aesthetic and aesthetic as lawcxv. In order to overcome this, 
an understanding of art/law must open the closure of art to capital’s form, through allowing for 
matter’s own power to change, resist, and alter us, through material and (im)material practices of 
art and law, artists, lawyers and agitators and their audiences; making space for the entropic 
movement of change and uncertainty as justice in the ‘/’cxvi. 
Art/Law as Resistant (In)Formalism  
 
 “Without entropy there would be no possibility of exchange, and without entropy there would be no 
art.” 
 
France and He’naut ‘Art, therefore entropy’cxvii 
 
 
 
 
 
Right at the beginning of this journey into art/law, was an important invitation by artist-agitator 
Adelita Husni-Bey to participate in the drafting of a convention on use-value property, that was also 
a piece of art. ‘White Paper: The Law’ ran in collaboration with Casco, Office for Art, Design and 
Theory, Utrecht, Netherlands in 2015 (fig. 3). A call of protest and squatting movements seeking to 
assert a new way of property, and even a new way of art, ‘White Paper’ was a powerful coming 
together of art, occupation, property, radical law, housing, home and protest expressed within 
squatting practices and communities. Groups of scholars and activists were involved in the writing of 
the convention to reflect the wishes of the squatting community when fighting evictions where a 
‘use-value’ understanding of property in law, could be used by the squatting community in the 
Netherlands. The CUS ‘Convention on the Use of Space’ was drafted with the aim of being used as a 
viable document by and for squatters in defence against a number of threats to their existence and 
way of life in light of the criminalisation of all squatting in the country since 2010. As part of the final 
exhibition, various documents and media taken from the drafting meetings were shown as works of 
art simultaneously (fig. 4). This public drafting of the law was a contemporary reminder of the 
people as legislators and the unremitting role of law within protest, particularly around the right to 
[Insert Fig. 3 White Paper: The Law (2015), Adelita Husni-Bey] [Insert Fig. 4 Convention on the Use of Space (2015), Adelita Husni-Bey] 
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housing, the right to a home, and the right to use and not to own per se. This was innovation of an 
agonist law, a re-conceptualisation of property in terms of a nonlinear, transient and practice-based 
coming together of art and law.  Husni-Bey’s insurgent intersection of art, law and protest, set the 
standard for the possibilities of art/law to come, an altered space of the unknown, a meeting of 
minds, cooperation and learning that art, law and resistance’s re-worlding can bring.  
 
Another artist working with the space of uncertainty and change of law and justice, appreciating the 
importance of using his cross-section of both legal and creative thought, is lawyer-artist Jack Tan 
whose ‘Karaoke Court’ (2015) has been demonstrating the power of song in resolving disputes as per 
the Inuit tradition of the ‘song duel’ (fig. 5).  Participants are given an opportunity to a real-life 
disagreement, within the setting of a mock court in a theatre where the audience direct a real Circuit 
Judge as to which claimant should win, based on their assessment of the singing.  The decisions are 
unforeseen and have legally binding consequences, the ruling becomes a contract the parties agree 
to adhere to once they leave the Karaoke Court space. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
Is this what Bishop would see as participation merged with spectacle?  Perhaps so, where audience, 
advocate, victim, culprit, and judge are all playing the role as part of the picture. Inspired by Husni-
Bey’s movement-centred legislation, the ‘Art/Law Network’ was formed in 2015, with a specific 
desire to ‘create new social relations’ at the intersection of art and law, where artists, lawyers and 
agitators work together, sharing and merging practices, in the name of social change (fig. 6).  The 
convergence both on and off line, of events, collaborations, connections, is a living and breathing 
aspiration of art/law and one in its early days. Being part of this network has been vitalising and 
holds much more in its continued ambition to create junctures where advocates, thinkers, creatives 
of all forms, can work together. 
 
Art/law has been no more exemplarily expressed within the Turner Prize nominated work of the 
Goldsmiths-based Forensic Architectures’ research group.  Using architecture as ‘an optic tool’ in the 
investigation of human rights violations, their methodology focusing on matter and its propensity to 
change, where ‘material artefacts’’cxviii: 
  
[Insert Fig. 5 Karaoke 
Court (2015), Jack Tan] [Insert Fig. 6 Art/Law Network Design (2016), Neeta Pederson and Lucy Finchett-Maddock] 
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“..relevance is located not exclusively in what they can tell us about the historic events to 
which they gesture as technical witnesses, but also in their struggle to meet the court’s 
demand for coherent accounts of history”.   
 
 
Here Susan Schuppli (key thinker within the collective, alongside Eyal Weisman), is referring to two 
defective video tapes in the aftermath of the massacres at Izbica and Padalishte, Kosovo, in March 
1999 used as evidence in the trials of Slobodan Milošević and Milan Milutinović at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). These tapes had changed and decayed over time, 
and yet Schuppli argues as a result provides a ‘material biography’ of the event recorded, the altered 
aesthetic as a result of the decay bringing to the fore the inertness and trauma of the dead bodies 
that may or may not have appeared so apparent previously (fig. 7).  Schuppli describes the “political 
dimensions are rendered visible”cxix, as the material bears witness “..forcing an intensification of 
affect that supplements and at times even supersedes the horror and despair captured on video”cxx. 
 
 
 
 
 
It is the work of artists-come-agitators-come-lawyers such as Husni-Bey, Tan, Forensic Architectures 
and Art/Law Network, that is forging the path of art/law, in a way empirically different from previous 
forms of legal, creative and resistant action, by accounting for the alternation of change, within their 
accounts of law, and within their practice.  This is where form, composition and its metamorphosis, 
meet with its environment, accounting for legality and what is argued here, movements of justice. 
This may be as simple as contact with air in its processes of degradation.  In another way, this may 
be where an object of art/law, whether that be legal statute, sculpture or protest banner, meets its 
audience. The uncertain dimensions that may come as a result of this, are the congenital heart of the 
work, creating a resistant (in)formalism that critiques the formalism of individual property 
aesthetics, or the commodity form. 
 
Acknowledging previous ways artists have or have not taken into consideration their audience, this 
harks back to the debate around relational aesthetics and art’s ability to always render a political 
response, as opposed to deliberate provocations of social engagement. But this specific accounting 
for the uncertain, for disorder, is recognising the incompleteness of law and justice, not just a shift 
to a relational aesthetics where there is a deliberate political end of an artwork. As Coolecxxi 
describes, “many artists and designers are returning to matter to explore immanent, elusive, and 
reclusive, properties of materials, working with chemical or biophysical qualities in response to 
degrading or emergent forms and their provocative invitations”.  This new materialist philosophy of 
[Insert Fig. 7 Video Grabs Padalishte Massacre, Susan Schuppli (2015)] 
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the becoming is an integral ethos of the art/law practice becoming prevalent, and necessary, 
reasserting an incompleteness in an age that seems to only strike to complete, full of resurgent 
totalitarianisms.  Connecting the dots to a critique of capital, accounting for matter speaks to an 
Althusserian materialism of encounter that McKee describes as an ‘aleatory jurisprudence’cxxii, 
illustrating a theory of surplus value also within new accounts of matter and change. As Diederichsen 
argues, the interplay of formal and informal, material and immaterial […], “[i]s a theory of 
input/objectification and output for purposes of exchange”cxxiii, where the spectacle exploits all 
matter and affect, and will seek to exploit even the birthing of art/law. 
 
What Kaymancxxiv
cxxvi
 refers to as the legal power of the ‘liminality between the inert and the animated’ 
is the move from informal to formal, where a turn to matter and mattering, is an expression of the 
power that objects echo back over law, and a recognition of the demoted place of the sovereign 
human who thus far has not instituted responsibility for this.  This tells of a compound and emergent 
art/law, where at each given iteration, there is a confounded newness that is an entropy, a whole 
that is not the sum of its parts.  This relates to Harman’s object-oriented-ontology that does not 
argue the existence of intangible relations but does so the material and (im)materiality of objects 
and objects’ experience of themselves and other beings inert or otherwise, as opposed to purely 
anthropocentric claims to experience and perception.  There is an inherent point of departure, 
therefore, between Harman and Bourriaud, to the extent that Harman aims to decontextualise the 
object (or in this instance, an artwork) so as to reveal that which is hidden to human cognition, as it 
is always already within its ‘frame’, some arguing supportive of a formalism and representationalism.  
Whereas Bourriaud’s ‘artwork as social interstice’cxxv specifically catalyses the human experience as a 
series of interactions, coinciding with Western art’s calculated turn to consider works and their 
social engagement.  Harman would argue that art worlds and law worlds are onto-epistemic objects 
existing materially but also immaterially, they talk to one another .  Both Harman and Bourriaud, 
however, are speaking of the affect and (im)matter of form, that “.. does not represent a theory of 
art, [as] this would imply the statement of an origin and a destination, but a theory of form”cxxvii. 
 
In a similar way, Lyotard askedcxxviii, “what is it to experience an affect proper to art?” This 
consideration of the interaction of
cxxix, a conjuring that speaks of the similarly extraordinary role of the juridical. 
 art with its surroundings was poised in his writings on the sublime 
and the avant-garde and can be helpful when considering how art itself may experience law, and 
vice versa. He stated that it is thanks to art, the soul is returned to the agitated zone between life 
and death  
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This breaking down the institutional artifice of art worlds and law worlds, offering a form of resistant 
(in)formalism, accounts for entropy and change, describes the role of form, audience and practice 
within property, legal and aesthetic establishment.  
Onto-Epistemic Ethics – Practice, Audience, Change 
 
Art/Law brings with it a sense of urgency, an ethical demand that sits at the end of law in the sense 
of an end of any law with force, that knows its origin in land, as matter.  Global law today, is a 
scaffold that upends commerce, and has been made to do so, no longer recognising its material 
beginning. It only seeks to re-exploit, re-extract, re-render the political and capitalise in order to 
further its aims, of which it has forgotten in an amnesia of property and institutionalisation. At the 
same time, art/law enters in a contemporaneity of colonised voices thrash at the pain of Western 
law’s past and continued ignominy. Whilst global legality is busy eating itself, doused in flames of 
capital, this strength in new generations poses an opportunity, a plurality, a decolonial opening of 
recognition; new worldly aesthetics and legal pluralisms.  Art/law is occurring at one of the many 
ends of art, where there is a possibility to extend a philosophy out of its finality
cxxxi
cxxx, as well as 
recognition of art before the era of art and the colonisation of legal-aesthetic form . 
 
Art/law is ‘post-medium’ where the artist/lawyer/agitator is as one, as well as the audience.  In this 
sense the ‘onto-epistemic ethics’ of Karen Barad explains the centrifugal role of matter and change 
in art/law through practice, creating paths of seeing, knowing, being and learning.  Barad puts 
forward the political necessity of understanding how we come to know the world around us as 
connected to the way we are, how we ‘be’.  This is through agential realism where we do not 
interact, but intra-act, creating and performing new moments or objects each time we walk within 
the world, through the performance of our matter; a mattering of ethics, the senses our intra-
actions create, and how we are in turn able to acknowledge this. 
 
Atkinsoncxxxii
cxxxiii
cxxxiv
 uses Barad to speak of the affective force of art in terms of a ‘poietic materialism’, 
“where the notion of poiesis refers to the process of appearing, the appearing of new possibilities 
for making, seeing, thinking, feeling”. It is this same affective force that is necessary right now with 
art/law, where we are able to use our ‘seeing power’, as Thompson  calls it, and forge meaning, 
existence and erudition distinct and wise of the past, with a graceful treatment of the future.  It is a 
call to the intangible similar to Fischer-Lescano, who proclaims “only when the law does justice to 
the rational and the arational alike will a different law ‘beyond legal violence’ become possible” . 
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We have the power to see through matter, or better still see with matter.  This is not a visual 
technique, but the manipulation of matter, and matter’s manipulation of us, through a central ethos 
of practicecxxxv cxxxvi
cxxxvii.  Further, Watt speaks of the 
similarity between the practices of law and artcxxxviii
.  Practice repeats Haraway’s  fabulation, imagination, narratology through touch, 
skill, dexterity, presence, tactility, resourcefulness, and practicality. Relaying the importance of the 
use of tools, Sammons reminds us of what can be learnt from art and law coming together: “What 
there [is] to teach, therefore, [is] not a technique, but a way of being with the materials of the art, a 
certain form of receptiveness to their own separate existence”
: 
 
“Only when legal practice is re-imagined as the creative art of moving minds 
through rhetorical performance do the deep and ancient connections between 
legal practice and critical, ethical thought become obvious. We will then see that 
‘moving’ minds is not coercive, but communal. We move others when we 
ourselves are open to be moved and when we are able to imagine ways of 
moving.” 
 
This brings us back art school and law school, where art and law are educated, where the institution 
of property is learnt, both Scholette and Bishop seeing pedagogy and the development of new 
institutions as the turning point of new matterings. Instilling a pedagogy of art/law in both legal and 
artistic institutions, recasts the mould to incorporate the unknown in a speculative ethos of 
audiencing. For Daney ‘all form is a face looking at us’, the call of the Other, the uncertain, the 
unknown; and it is that which is inexplicable but must be accounted for. 
A Re-Worlding - Art/Law Convergence 
 
 “Rather than the destiny of state and nomad, critical scholarship needs to 
contend with the crafting of diagrams and exploring the potential of the artisan.” 
 
Bottomley and Moore ‘Law, Diagram, Film: Critique Exhausted’cxxxix 
 
In recent years, the artist has increasingly been looked to as a progenitor of change, by engaging 
with global politics. Justice and injustice are clearly catechisms that are troubling not just jurists, 
judges, politicians (you would hope), but also artists, seeking to be the filter for those who are 
experiencing inequity in all its myriad and phantasmic forms, relayed back to us through our online 
networks or our corporal engagement.  
 
Bishop speaks of a need for perversity, paradox and negation in aesthesiscxl, and to someone 
unfamiliar with legal and aesthetic theory, nothing is more absurd and abstruse than a coterminacy 
of art and law: two supposedly entirely unrelated entities that would seem to almost repel, yet in 
their repulsion are the greatest of attractors. As we know this convergence of the autonomies of art 
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and law, is possibly through the bridge of change and resistance in the ‘/‘ where the phenomena of 
art/law is an overt imbrication of Art and Law for social change. It suggests a space where artists, 
lawyers and activists are working together, where the artist and the lawyer are gatekeepers to 
knowledge bridging the philosophical and the practical in response to divisive geopolitics, whilst 
simultaneously realising the culpability of the art world in relations of commodity, property, 
colonialism, law, ultimately revealing nonduality of art, law, resistance in turn. If anything, art/law 
should teach us the power of our handicraft, the force of our might and the diligence of our 
concentration, to breaking down violent boundaries and build new imaginary institutionscxli from the 
informal sculptures of matter, practice and change. 
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